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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT MARTHA A. TOTZKE 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
RESPONDENT PROPERTY INHERITED BY HER SEPARATE FROM 
THE MARITAL ASSET DIVISION. 
II 
DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
RESPONDENT CHILD SUPPORT OF $600.00 PER MONTH. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Dr. and Mrs. Totzke were married on 
January 27, 1962. (R-71) They had four children. 
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The two oldest were emancipated and attending school 
at the University of Utah. (R-71) The youngest was 
residing with Mrs. Totzke and the other child was 
residing with Dr. Totzke. This custody arrangement 
was by agreement of the parties. (R-72) 
At the time of their marriage, Mrs. Totzke 
was going to school at LSU. She concluded her 
education at the University of Tampa in 1963 with a 
BS in education. Her education was paid for by her 
father. (R-72, 73) 
Dr. Totzke was in his first two years of 
residency at Tampa General in pathology. In 1963, 
the Totzkes moved to Houston where Dr. Totzke 
finished his last two years of residency and Mrs. 
Totzke taught school. (R-73) When Dr. Totzke 
completed his residency, the parties moved to Ogden 
where he went into practice. The parties1 first 
child was born shortly thereafter in 1966. (R-73) 
Since the birth of their first child and up 
to the time of the parties1 separation, Mrs. Totzke 
had been exclusively a housewife and homemaker. 
Dr. Totzke was continuously employed as a 
pathologist. (R-74) 
At the time of the divorce trial, Mrs. Totzke 
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was working for Ogden Food Service at Park City 
Resort as a supervisor/cashier earning $6.00 per 
hour. She had no specific desire to return to 
teaching, but even if she were to do so, it would 
require recertification in the State of Utah. (R-76) 
Dr. Totzke was employed as a pathologist at 
McKay-Dee Hospital with an annual gross salary of 
$140,000.00. (R-77) 
Between 1980 and 1984, the parties had 
additional dividends and interest income averaging 
$45,000.00 per year which were produced from property 
inherited by Mrs. Totzke from her father. For those 
same years, the parties also received approximately 
$12,000.00 per year from other investment properties 
they had purchased. (R-77) 
At trial, Mrs. Totzke testified concerning 
the assets listed in her Trial Outline and Settlement 
Proposal. (R-75) At the time of their separation, 
the Totzkes each had an automobile which was paid 
for. Dr. Totzke retained all of the large items of 
furniture, all of which were valued for the Court. 
(R-28, 78-80) Other assets, referred to as marital 
assets, were those items actually purchased or 
obtained through the efforts of the parties during 
the marriage as distinguished from property inherited 
by either of the parties. (R-29, 30, 80-85) 
Mrs. Totzke acknowledged that during the 
course of the marriage, her husband inherited 
$50,000.00 which was used for marital purposes. 
(R-85) She testified concerning property she 
inherited from her father which was specifically 
listed in her Trial Outline. (R-31, 85-86) 
Mrs. Totzke originally inherited the property when 
her father died in 1966. It was initially placed in 
a ten year trust and administered by the Homer 
National Bank. (R-86) During that ten year period, 
the parties received modest dividends of $3,000.00 to 
$5,000.00 per year, all of which were used for 
marital purposes. (R-86) 
In 1976, the property was removed from the 
trust and transferred to Mrs. Totzke. Beginning in 
1976, the income and dividends produced by the 
inherited property substantially increased. (R-86) 
From 1980 to 1984, those inherited assets alone 
produced $225,000.00, all of which was used to 
acquire additional marital assets or provide for 
marital needs. (R-87) 
Mrs. Totzke testified that in 1985 the income 
produced by her inherited property was approximately 
$30,000.00. It was anticipated to be less for 1986 
because of the diminished value of the leases in 
timber. (R-88) Dr. Totzke agreed that the income 
produced from the timber property in Arkansas and 
Louisiana would be less in the foreseeable future 
than it had been in the past. (R-162) 
Mrs. Totzke was willing to waive alimony on 
the basis that she would be entitled to receive the 
income-producing property inherited by her and a cash 
settlement to equalize the proposed distribution of 
the marital assets. (R-89) The testimony of 
Mrs. Totzke concerning child support was in the 
context of what was referred to as the Uniform Child 
Support Schedule. (R-33, 87, 88) 
While not outlining her actual monthly needs 
in arriving at a suggested child support figure, 
Mrs. Totzke relied on the probable difference of her 
income compared to her husband's and the Uniform 
Child Support Schedule. (R-109-111) 
Dr. Totzke acknowledged that Mrs. Totzke 
would have similar monthly expenses to support 
herself and Chris as those that he had itemized and 
listed in his Exhibits 3 and 4. (R-170, 171) 
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ARGUMENT 
DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
RESPONDENT PROPERTY INHERITED BY HER SEPARATE FROM 
THE MARITAL ASSET DIVISION. 
After listening to the evidence, hearing the 
arguments of counsel, and considering the matter 
while under advisement, Judge Hyde concluded in his 
Memorandum Decision: 
"The major dispute between the parties 
appears to be the distribution of the 
property. Plaintiff inherited considerable 
property from her parents. The defendant 
takes the position that all property is joint 
and requests disposition accordingly. 
Plaintiff takes the position that the 
inherited property is separate and not part 
of the marital assets. I hold that the 
inherited property that is still easily 
identifiable is not a marital asset and does 
belong to the plaintiff as her separate 
property. The evidence shows that the 
defendant did inherit $50,000.00 which was 
absorbed into the marital relationship, 
however, the income from the plaintiff's 
property would be over $200,000.00 that was 
also absorbed into the marital relationship 
and no doubt has accounted for an increase in 
the marital assets. 
Each of the parties has submitted a proposed 
distribution. The defendant's proposal 
basically gives the plaintiff what she 
inherited, plus approximately $80,000.00 in 
other properties, and he takes the balance 
which includes the family home. 
The requested division by plaintiff strikes 
me as basically being very fair. Her 
requested division is made so as to not 
disturb the defendant any more than 
necessary. This is an instance where alimony 
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could easily be asked and probably be 
awarded. She makes $6.00 per hour; he makes 
some $140,000.00 per year. She makes no 
claim to his business and no request for 
alimony. The defendant argues that 
plaintiff's proposed request for distribution 
creates a real injustice for him. It appears 
to me that she has made every effort to make 
the division so as to not disturb the 
defendant's business or living arrangements. 
I must comment that it is much more equitable 
than his proposal which, in effect, would 
have given her her inherited property, no 
alimony, no support, while he would take 
basically the marital assets and have no 
claim against his business corporation. 
I accept and adopt the plaintiff's proposed 
distribution set out on the Trial Outline on 
Page 8, with the exception that in the 
distribution to the defendant, it appears the 
CMA savings correct figure is $53,000.00 
rather than $64,000.00." (R-20, 21) 
(Emphasis added) 
This is simply a case of a trial judge 
exercising appropriate discretion in making a 
property division which he believes to be fair and 
equitable and which should not be disturbed on 
appeal. 
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980) was 
similar to this case. The parties had been married 
for thirty-one years. The plaintiff worked while the 
defendant attended and completed dental school. 
Defendant established a dentistry practice and 
plaintiff became a homemaker and housewife caring for 
their three children. Plaintiff received separate 
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property from her father which, in one year, produced 
income of nearly $4 ,000.00. Plaintiff contributed 
from her separate funds to furnish a home and pay on 
a mortgage. The trial Court awarded two-thirds of 
the marital assets to plaintiff and defendant 
received one-third. On appeal, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the property division and held that the 
division and distribution of marital property is a 
matter wherein the trial Court has been invested with 
broad discretion and will not be disturbed absent a 
clear abuse of such discretion. at 1382. 
This Court has, on many occasions, referred 
to the trial Court's duty and discretion in the 
division of a marital estate. It has also set the 
standard for review on appeal. 
It is the Court's duty to make a division of 
the property and income in a divorce proceeding so 
that the parties may readjust their lives to the new 
situation as well as possible. MacDonald v. 
MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951). 
"There is no fixed rule or formula for the 
distribution of a marital estate." Turner v. Turner, 
649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982). 
A trial Court's apportionment of marital 
property will not be disturbed unless it works such a 
manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear 
abuse of discretion. Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P. 2d 184 
(Utah 1977). 
The actions of the trial Court are indulged 
with a presumption of validity, and the burden is 
upon appellant to prove such a serious inequity as to 
manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Searle v. 
Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974) 
See also Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 
(Utah 1982); Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468 (Utah 
1984); and Claus v. Claus, 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 
(1986) . 
Appellant contends that the trial Court 
abused its discretion by awarding Mrs. Totzke all of 
the property inherited from her father. There is 
considerable legal support that it is not inequitable 
to restore to one party that which was inherited 
during a marriage. 
In Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 
1982), there was no error in the District Court's 
refusal to award husband a share of the property the 
wife acquired as an inheritance during the marriage 
even though the husband had done some work on the 
inherited property. 
It is true that in Workman v. Workman, 652 
P.2d 931 (Utah 1982), the Court said that the rule 
that each party recover the separate property brought 
into the marriage was not invariable, but it 
acknowledged that significant compensating factors in 
that case justified a substantial imbalance in the 
overall division of all the property and an invasion 
of the separate property concept. Specifically in 
Workman, the husband retained his entire pension and 
had no alimony obligations. 
In the Totzke case, Judge Hyde concluded the 
division of assets was fair because of no request for 
alimony "where alimony could easily be asked and 
probably be awarded", and the division does "not 
disturb the defendant's business or living 
arrangements". 
It is acknowledged that courts may consider 
inherited property as a marital asset if equity to 
the parties require that consideration or if joint 
marital efforts have been made to enhance the value 
or retain the inherited property. On the other hand, 
if the inherited property is still easily 
identifiable and has no enhancement value resulting 
from the joint efforts, skills or funds of either 
spouse, it is not error to retain the inherited 
property as the separate property of the spouse who 
has inherited the same. See Templeton v. Templeton, 
656 P.2d 250 (Okl. 1983); Mothershed v. Mothershed, 
701 P.2d 405 (Okl. 1985); Preston v. Preston, supra; 
Peterson v. Peterson, 484 P.2d 736 (Ida. 1971). See 
also Kruse v. Kruse, 586 P.2d 294 (Mont. 1978) and In 
Re Marriage of Merry, 689 P.2d 1250 (Mont. 1984) 
which are contrary to the Montana case of Vivian v. 
Vivian, 583 P.2d 1072 (Mont. 1978), cited by 
appellant. 
All of the other cases cited by appellant had 
some rational basis for treating inherited property 
as a marital asset capable of joint distribution and 
are clearly distinguishable from this case. 
In Mack v. Mack, 389 So.2d 1156 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 1980), the husband's inherited property 
contributed approximately 77% of the family's annual 
support for their standard of living while the 
husband's salary contributed only 23%. Mrs. Totzke's 
inherited property, even in the best years, only 
produced approximately 20% of the family's annual 
income. 
In Rosson v. Rosson/ 635 P.2d 469 (Alaska 
1981), the husband utilized considerable efforts in 
enhancing the value of the wife's inherited property. 
He built an apartment complex on a piece of 
undeveloped land that was later sold. He built their 
joint residence on another lot. There was also a 
statute in Alaska specifically allowing the Court to 
invade separate property of either spouse when 
balancing the equities. 
In Sheedy v. Sheedy, 623 P.2d 95 (Hawaii App. 
1981), the inheritance to the wife was actually from 
the husband's father, preceding which, both parties 
had cared for the father in their home for one year 
after he suffered a stroke and was totally 
incapacitated. Hawaii also had a statute permitting 
a family court in divorce cases to distribute 
separate property so long as it was just and 
equitable. 
McCain v. McCain, 549 P.2d 896 (Kan. 1976), 
also involved a state statute specifically allowing a 
trial court to divide inherited property. The 
husband had inherited the property in question in 
McCain which had been used for the marital home of 
the parties and their children and which was also 
improved with money inherited by the wife. 
The fifteen factors referred to in MacDonald 
v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951), for 
the Court to consider in adjusting the rights and 
obligations of the parties were outlined by 
Dr. Totzke in his brief as he felt they applied to 
this situation. Some notable comments must be made 
of his comparison. 
In factor number 8, under the present income 
of the parties, he claims she is expected to annually 
earn $74,274.00. This is broken down by him on 
page 6 of appellant's brief as follows: 
Works ($6.00 x 2000 hours) $12,000.00 
Property 45,000.00 
Equaling payments 17 , 272.00 
$74,272.00 
Mrs. Totzke's inherited property is not 
expected to earn $45,000.00 per year in the 
foreseeable future. Both parties indicated that the 
years between 1980 to 1984 were the peak years and 
future income would be lower. In 1985, for instance, 
it was approximately $30,000.00 and anticipated less 
for 1986. (R-88) By this appeal, Dr. Totzke is 
attempting to take away the $17,274.00 annual 
equaling payments he is required to make under the 
Decree. If he is successful, then Mrs. Totzkefs 
annual income would be closer to $40,000.00 compared 
to his $140,000.00. 
In factor number 9 of the MacDonald analysis, 
it should be noted that the property inherited by 
Mrs. Totzke and awarded to her in the divorce, 
retained its separate identity throughout the 
marriage, retained its value and produced the income 
it did without any marital effort whatsoever. 
In factor number 14, Dr. Totzke omitted the 
fact that his wife remained at home for approximately 
twenty years of their marriage and raised their 
children and provided all of the other homemaking 
needs. He was able to work in his profession, 
increase his skills and provide for his future; she 
sacrificed similar opportunities for herself by 
remaining at home. 
Dr. Totzke outlined his present standard of 
living and needs as referred to in factor number 15. 
He provided explanation and justification contending 
that he should be able to retain all of his income to 
provide for his needs without paying his wife any 
child support or property settlement equalizing 
payments. He did acknowledge, however, that his 
wife's needs and typical expenses would be equal to 
his if there were sufficient income which she 
obviously did not have. 
The bottom line is this: Judge Hyde made a 
fair and equitable decision. As he stated in his 
Memorandum Decision, this was a case where alimony 
could easily be asked and probably be awarded. By 
making the property division he did, Mrs. Totzke was 
awarded no alimony and Dr. Totzke's business and 
living arrangements were totally undisturbed. 
Mrs. Totzke obtained the inherited property which 
still retained its separate identity. She made no 
claim on the several hundred thousand dollars income 
the inherited property produced during the marriage 
to acquire other assets or provide marital benefits. 
Of the marital assets, she was actually awarded 36% 
and Dr. Totzke was awarded 64%. It was equalized by 
requiring him to pay her the balancing difference 
over a ten year period. This property division was 
clearly within the discretion of the trial Judge. 
II 
DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
RESPONDENT CHILD SUPPORT OF $600.00 PER MONTH. 
It is acknowledged that Mrs. Totzke did not 
offer any specific evidence of her own as to her 
needs justifying a particular amount of child 
support. By cross-examination of Dr. Totzke, 
however, he acknowledged that her living needs and 
needs of the child in her custody would be similar 
and equal to those specifically outlined by him. 
That was evidence upon which Judge Hyde could rely 
and which could easily justify the award of $600.00 
per month given even the most optimistic view of her 
income. 
The child support statute, 78-45-7, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, was amended in 1984 to provide: 
(4) In determining the amount of prospective 
support on an ex parte or other motion for 
temporary support, the Court shall use a 
uniform statewide assessment formula, 
adjusted for regional differences, prior to 
rendering the support order. The formula 
shall provide for all relevant factors which 
can be readily identified and shall allow for 
reasonable deductions from the obligor's 
earnings for taxes, work-related expenses, 
and living expenses. The assessment formula 
shall be established by the Department of 
Social Services and periodically reviewed by 
the Judicial Council under Subsection 
78-3-21(3). 
In connection with this statute and even 
before its enactment, Weber and Davis Counties had 
created and used what has come to be known as the 
Uniform Child Support Schedule. Whether right or 
wrong, the Judges of the Second District have rather 
religiously followed that "Schedule" both for 
temporary and permanent child support orders. As a 
result, lawyers who practice in the Second District 
have come to rely on the "Schedule" for an estimate 
of appropriate child support since the formula, by 
statute, was supposed to take into account general 
work-related expenses and living needs of the 
parents. It was because of this reliance on the 
"Schedule" that this line of questioning occurred 
between Mrs. Totzke and her counsel: 
"Q. Going to page nine, with respect to the 
child support, I have gone over with you, have I not, 
the child support schedule that is utilized in this 
accounting? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And we have taken your income based upon 
$6.00 an hour at the full year's employment, as well 
as a $45,000.00 a year average from your dividends, 
in arriving at an average gross monthly income; is 
that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that $45,000.00 figure going to be 
realistic for the foreseeable future? 
A. It will not, because we are not getting 
leases, and the timber is rock-bottom. This year it 
was about $30,000.00, and I suspect it will be less 
next year. 
Q. So we're really at the top end of the 
spectrum at even suggesting that would be your 
income; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then the difference in the gross monthly 
average income of your husband, we have arrived at 
the child support figure suggested in there, is that 
correct? 
A. Yes." (R-87, 88) 
The Page 9 referred to in this exchange was 
from Mrs. Totzke•s Exhibit and provided as follows: 
"CHILD SUPPORT AND CASH SETTLEMENT" 
"Based upon the assumption that plaintiff 
continues to work full-time earning $6.00 per 
hour and will continue to receive an average 
of $45,000.00 per year from her inherited 
property, plaintiff would have an average 
gross monthly income of $4,800.00. 
Based upon defendant's average monthly gross 
income of nearly $12,000.00, there is a 
$7,200.00 gross monthly income disparity 
which, according to the Uniform Child Support 
Schedule, plaintiff would be entitled to 
child support over and above that which she 
owes to defendant of $786.00 per month." 
(R-33) 
This also accounts for Judge Hyde's 
Memorandum Decision comments: 
"As to the child support, the figures here 
are not covered by our charts. There is a 
large discrepancy between the parties1 
monthly incomes, and the child living with 
the plaintiff should be entitled to the 
benefit of the defendant's substantial 
income. However, there are two children 
going to college. While they are technically 
emancipated, the parties both agree that they 
should go to college and they are being 
assisted in their college educations, which 
does constitute substantial expense. I hold 
that the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff 
the sum of $600.00 per month over and above 
what she would owe to the defendant as and 
for child support." (R-22) 
Judge Hyde indicated the figures here were 
not covered by "our charts". That is because 
Dr. Totzke's annual gross income exceeded that which 
is listed as the highest income on the "Schedule". 
As referred to above, Mrs. Totzke's approach was to 
use the probable income disparity between them and 
then apply the "Schedule". 
Respondent submits that reliance on the 
"Schedule" in this case, as well as most other 
divorces, is not misplaced. Dr. Totzke did not 
contradict the suggestion that his wife's needs and 
expenses for her and the child in her custody would 
be similar to his. He presented no evidence to show 
that the support schedule approach was not valid. 
The whole divorce arena is usually surrounded 
with acrimony. The use of the child support formula 
has provided some uniformity and predictability as to 
reasonable child support except for those unusual 
circumstances where other evidence would suggest a 
different approach. As a result, contested issues 
and bitterness relating to child support have been 
reduced considerably by reliance and use of the 
support schedule. Its use should not be discounted 
or eliminated so every litigant has to produce 
specific evidence of needs and expenses justifying 
child support. 
A copy of the Uniform Child Support Schedule 
is contained in the Addendum. 
CONCLUSION 
Because of the length of the marriage, the 
respective incomes and income producing abilities of 
the parties, the plaintiff having spent approximately 
twenty years of the married life exclusively as a 
homemaker and housewife and because no alimony was 
awarded to the plaintiff, it was not error for the 
Court to award Mrs. Totzke all of the property 
inherited by her from her father as her separate 
property, nor was it error for the Court to award her 
child support of $600.00 per month. 
DATED this /d~ day of September, 1986. 
Respectfully submitted, 
)RENCE AND HUTCHISON 
BRIAN R. FLORENCE 
Attorney for Respondent 
818-26th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and 
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent, 
postage prepaid, to Richard W. Campbell, Attorney for 
Appellant, 2485 Grant Avenue #200, Ogden, UT 84401, 
on this /Q— day of September, 1986. 
BRIAN R. FLORENCE 
Attorney for Respondent 
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TOTAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN 
RANGE 
ft™"3** 
3065-3150 
3152-3240 
3241-3329 
3330-3418 
3419-3507 
3509-3597 
3398-3686 
3687-3775 
3776-3864 
3866-3954 
T953-4043 
4044-4132 
4133-4221 
4223-4311 
4312-4400 
4401-4489 
4490-4578 
45BO-4668 
4669-4757 
4758-4846 
4847-4933 
4937-5023 
5026-5114 
5115-5203 
5204-5292 
5294-5382 
5383-5471 
5472-5S6U 
5561-5649 
5651-5739 
5740-5828 
3829-5917 
5918-6006 
6008-6096 
6'J97-6185 
6186-6274 
6275-6363 
6365—6453 
6454-6542 
6543-6631 
ao72-e>720 
6722-68l<> 
6811-6899 
69O0-69S8 
6989-7077 
7079-7167 
7168-7256 
7257-7343 
7346-7434 
7436-7324 
7525-7613 
7614-7702 
7703-7791 
7793-7881 
7882-7970 
7971-8039 
8U6U-8148 
8150-8238 
8239-8327 
6328-8416 
8417-8505 
8507-8593 
8596-8684 
8685-8773 
8774-8862 
8864-8932 
8953-9041 
9O42-9130 
9131-9219 
°221-9T09 
9310-9398 
9399-9487 
9488-9576 
9379-9666 
°667-9755 
975o-9844 
^845-9933 
1 
339 
348 
338 
368 
377 
337 
397 
407 
416 
426 
436 
446 
455 
463 
475 
485 
494 
304 
514 
523 
333 
343 
533 
562 
572 
582 
592 
601 
611 
621 
630 
64U 
650 
660 
6o9 
679 
689 
699 
708 
718 
723 
737 
747 
757 
767 
776 
786 
796 
806 
815 
825 
835 
844 
854 
864 
874 
883 
893 
903 
913 
922 
932 
942 
951 
961 
971 
981 
990 
1000 
1010 
1020 
1029 
1039 
1049 
1058 
1068 
1078 
2 
258 
265 
273 
280 
287 
295 
302 
310 
317 
324 
_>*~>4. 
339 
347 
334 
362 
369 
376 
384 
391 
399 
406 
413 
421 
428 
436 
443 
450 
458 
465 
473 
480 
487 
495 
502 
510 
517 
524 
cr — o 
539 
547 
554 
562 
569 
576 
584 
591 
599 
606 
613 
621 
628 
636 
643 
650 
658 
6*5 
673 
680 
687 
695 
702 
710 
717 
725 
732 
739 
747 
754 
762 
769 
776 
784 
791 
799 
806 
813 
321 
3 
203 
209 
213 
*^ 21 
227 
*>w v.* 
239 
244 
250 
256 
262 
268 
274 
279 
285 
291 
297 
303 
309 
315 
320 
326 
332 
338 
344 
350 
353 
361 
367 
373 
379 
385 
391 
396 
402 
408 
414 
420 
426 
431 
437 
443 
449 
455 
461 
467 
472 
478 
484 
490 
496 
502 
507 
513 
519 
525 
531 
537 
543 
548 
554 
560 
566 
572 
578 
583 
589 
593 
6<J1 
6e>7 
613 
619 
624 
630 
636 
642 
648 
4 
169 
174 
179 
184 
189 
194 
198 
203 
208 
213 
218 
223 
228 
233 
237 
242 
247 
252 
257 
262 
267 
271 
276 
281 
286 
291 
296 
301 
305 
310 
315 
320 
325 
330 
335 
340 
344 
349 
354 
359 
364 
369 
374 
378 
383 
388 
393 
398 
4U3 
408 
412 
417 
422 
427 
432 
437 
442 
447 
451 
456 
461 
466 
471 
476 
481 
483 
490 
493 
500 
503 
510 
515 
520 
524 
529 
534 
539 
5 
148 
152 
156 
160 
163 
169 
173 
177 
181 
186 
190 
194 
198 
203 
207 
211 
215 
220 
224 
228 
232 
237 
241 
245 
249 
254 
258 
262 
266 
270 
273 
279 
283 
287 
292 
296 
300 
304 
309 
313 
317 
321 
326 
330 
334 
338 
343 
347 
351 
355 
360 
364 
368 
372 
376 
381 
383 
389 
393 
398 
402 
406 
410 
415 
419 
423 
427 
432 
436 
440 
444 
449 
433 
457 
461 
466 
470 
6 
128 
132 
133 
139 
143" 
146 
150 
154 
157 
161 
165 
168 
172 
176 
179 
183 
187 
190 
194 
198 
202 
205 
209 
213 
216 
220 
224 
2"">7 
231 
235 
238 
242 
246 
249 
253 
237 
260 
264 
268 
271 
273 
279 
282 
286 
290 
293 
297 
301 
304 
308 
312 
316 
319 
323 
327 
330 
334 
338 
341 
343 
349 
332 
356 
360 
363 
367 
371 
374 
378 
382 
383 
389 
393 
396 
400 
404 
407 
7 
112 
U S 
118 
121 
125 
128 
131 
134 
138 
141 
144 
147 
150 
154 
157 
160 
163 
166 
170 
173 
176 
179 
183 
186 
189 
192 
195 
199 
202 
205 
208 
211 
215 
218 
221 
224 
227 
231 
234 
237 
240 
244 
247 
250 
253 
256 
260 
263 
266 
269 
272 
276 
279 
282 
283 
289 
292 
293 
298 
301 
305 
308 
311 
314 
317 
321 
324 
327 
330 
334 
337 
340 
343 
346 
350 
353 
356 
8_ 
102 
104 
107 
no 
113 
116 
119 
122 
123 
128 
131 
134 
137 
140 
142 
143 
148 
151 
154 
157 
160 
163 
166 
169 
172 
175 
177 
180 
183 
186 
189 
192 
193 
198 
201 
204 
207 
210 
212 
215 
218 
221 
224 
227 
230 
233 
236 
239 
242 
243 
247 
250 
253 
256 
259 
262 
265 
268 
271 
274 
277 
280 
283 
285 
288 
291 
294 
297 
300 
303 
306 
309 
312 
315 
318 
320 
323 
